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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 9, 1952

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OCT 1969/53* 25X1***NSC Declassification/ Release Instructions on File***MEMORANDUM

For: General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable David K. E. Bruce, Under Secretary of State
The Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Princeton Statement.

The enclosed draft statement, entered as item 5 on the agenda of the Board meeting for June 12, grew out of discussions at the Princeton Inn on May 10 and 11, which were chaired by Mr. C. D. Jackson and attended by a number of leading citizens and Government officials. Those who took the most active lead in urging the drafting and use of this statement seemed to be motivated by the following convictions:

1. That opportunities now exist for launching a major political warfare campaign in Eastern Europe.
2. That unless such a campaign is launched the captive peoples in that area will lose hope, and enterprises like RFE may as well go out of business.
3. That in order to initiate the campaign a statement should be made by the President or the Secretary of State.

A more conservative segment of participants at the Princeton Meeting, however, spoke in terms of what might be needed merely to sustain our present program of political warfare in Eastern Europe without commitment to anything more ambitious. The draft finally produced seems to have been thoroughly tempered by this point of view. It is believed to contain nothing that has not been said on various occasions in U.S. official statements. In fact it is less "forward" than the President's recent remark to a Rumanian delegation (see enclosure 2). Yet the RFE representatives at Princeton said that the proposed statement would give RFE the focus which it needs to continue its work.

Accordingly, the Board may wish to consider the draft from two points of view:

1. Should the draft or some modification of it be worked into an early speech, by the Secretary of State for example, in order to provide current psychological operations in Eastern Europe with needed support without implying any more ambitious programs there? If so, what would be the most suitable occasion? These questions can be decided without waiting for results of the more far-reaching inquiries outlined below, if the Board desires to pursue them.

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2. Would it be wise to step up our political warfare in Eastern Europe in the near future, perhaps with a view to eventual liberation or perhaps only for purposes of attrition? Such a question involves a complex of fundamental issues such as:

a. What are the principal trends in the morale of the captive peoples? Is it at a critical turning point? If so, is intensified political warfare the appropriate response on our part? This in turn raises broader questions:

b. What actually are our political warfare prospects in Eastern Europe? If we start a more aggressive campaign there, have we the resources to follow through adequately?

c. Would such a campaign be in accord with the present outlook of national policy and psychological strategy? In particular, what would be the effects of the campaign on other countries, including our allies?

d. Should the campaign, if decided upon, be launched by a high-level statement? If so what would be the most favorable time? Should the statement include other areas besides Europe, notably the Far East?

Light will probably be thrown on several of the above issues by the expected early completion by the NSC of its policy review of the NSC 68 and 114 series, and by the report of the group which has been working on the problem of a strategic concept, which I hope to receive soon.

J. B. Allen
Raymond B. Allen
Director

Enclosures:

1. Draft statement.
2. Remarks by President Truman.

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Enclosure 1.

DRAFT OF PRINCETON STATEMENTMAY 19, 1952

American foreign policy seeks to attain three goals: the defense of the United States, the creation and maintenance of a structure of world peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the development of conditions in which peoples may freely establish the governments and institutions under which they live.

In the War against Nazism the United States and Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as well, pledged themselves to the principle that the countries liberated from Nazi despotism should enjoy the right to governments of their own choice. The Soviet Union has repudiated this pledge and ruthlessly prevented the peoples of central and eastern Europe from exercising this right.

We share with these peoples the common interest that no single people shall again dominate Europe, destroying their national existence and threatening our own. It is therefore a basic tenet of American policy that political independence shall be restored to those countries within a framework of organization which will sustain the peace.

It is our belief that this goal can be attained without resort to war. To this end we propose--

To continue to strive, together with others, for the establishment of a Europe united for economic welfare and common security.

To support the entrance of the countries of central and eastern Europe now under Soviet domination, as equal members, into this family of friendly nations, as soon as their national liberties are restored.

To strive for a democratic unification of Germany in order that a Germany thus unified may become a constructive member of the European family, with assurance that it may not again be a threat to East or West.

To link these objectives to continuing efforts to achieve effective world-wide armament reduction and control, for which they would constitute powerful support.

Armament is a temporary shield necessary to hold an aggressor in check. It is not a means of satisfying the desire of all peoples to live in peace and freedom and to devote their energies and resources to human welfare in the light of the moral and religious values they cherish.

It is the evident lesson of this century that men cannot live in peace and freedom when Europe is threatened by the domination of a single power. All history teaches that no nation, however populous and whatever the ambitions of its governors, can render itself secure by attempts to impose its will upon other nations. Given effective world-wide security arrangements, our objectives can in no way threaten the Russian national interest. On the contrary, they afford the Russian people a security now denied them by the policies of the Soviet Regime, and only their attainment would permit the vast resources of Russia to be devoted to the welfare of the Russian peoples.

The stated goal of this declaration is peace with freedom for the peoples of many lands. The United States has no intention of attempting to impose its cultural, social, economic or political patterns on any country. It respects the cultural traditions of each nation as that nation's most precious heritage. It recognizes that each nation must be free to organize the forms of its national life, limited only by the common requirements of European and world peace. It proclaims that only thus will the deep spiritual, social, and economic aspirations of men find progressive fulfillment.

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Enclosure 2.

EXCERPT FROM REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO A
DELEGATION OF THE "AMERICAN ACTION COMMITTEE
AGAINST MASS DEPORTATIONS IN RUMANIA", May 28,
1952, AS REPORTED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES MAY 29.

"You are going to survive as a free country. You are going to
have our wholehearted cooperation in trying to survive. And if I
can continue our program which I have inaugurated, you are going to
be a free country again, before you pass on to the next world."

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Paul: This is an accurate statement of what took place at Princeton. I think we ought to press hard for the inclusion of this statement, or a stronger one in an early Presidential speech.

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